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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of environmental, social and governance (ESG) certification 
on Malaysian firms. The analysis shows that ESG certification lowers a firm’s cost of capital, 
while Tobin’s Q increases significantly. These findings, while consistent with existing studies 
in developed economies, demonstrate the value enhancement from corporate social 
responsibility disclosure by firms in emerging and developing nations. Overall, the study 
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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact on Malaysian firm value of environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) certification. The analysis shows that ESG certification lowers a firm’s 
cost of capital, while Tobin’s Q increases significantly. These findings are consistent with 
existing studies in developed economies demonstrating value enhancement from corporate 
social responsibility disclosure and highlights the benefits to stakeholders from firms 
pursuing an ESG agenda. 
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Does ESG certification add firm value? 
Highlights: 
 This paper examines the impact on Malaysian firm value of environmental, 
social and governance (ESG) certification.  
 The analysis shows that ESG certification lowers a firm’s cost of capital, 
while Tobin’s Q increases significantly.  
 These findings are consistent with existing studies in developed economies 
show positive benefits from external certification. 
 The results also demonstrate the value enhancement from firms pursing 
greater ESG disclosure 
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Does ESG certification add firm value? 
 
1. Introduction  
Does a third party environmental, social and governance (ESG) certification matter and 
importantly does it add firm value? The increasing number of firms covered by third party 
ESG rating providers suggests that these ratings are considered valuable to capital providers.
1
 
ESG investing is used by about a quarter of the world’s professional-managed investment 
funds, comprising about $20 trillion in assets.
2
 A reduction in certification costs paid by these 
investment funds for firms with ESG scores may significantly shift the demand for ESG 
stocks that ceteris paribus may lead to an increase in the valuation of ESG rated stocks 
compared to stocks without an ESG rating (Galema et al, 2008).
3
  
We investigate this question in the context of Malaysia and examine the impact that 
inclusion of a Bloomberg’s ESG rating has on the value of listed Malaysian firms. The 
institutional setting of Malaysia, with its common law background and strong domestic 
economy, provides lessons for other developing and emerging countries. The results add 
evidence to the ongoing theoretical debate, in the corporate and social responsibility (CSR) 
literature, on the costs and benefits to stakeholders of firms pursuing CSR policies and 
strategies. We show that there are significant financial benefits to Malaysian firms from ESG 
certification, which could also encourage cross-border investment flows into firms pursuing 
CSR policies. 
We hypothesize that when firms are included in Bloomberg’s ESG score, it sends a 
credible signal to prospective investors about a firm’s commitment to an ESG agenda. The 
private information related to ESG, which is not available prior to the inclusion of the ESG 
rating, helps reduce the monitoring costs of the capital provider and leads to higher firm 
value. In this study we verify this hypothesis by tracking the change in the cost of capital and 
Tobin’s Q for each firm, 5 years before and after they were included in Bloomberg’s ESG 
rating. This event study approach allows us to circumvent sample selection bias issues that 
                                                             
1 The eight notable ESG rating providers according to Huber et al. (2017) are: Bloomberg ESG Data Services, 
Corporate Knights Global 100, Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI), ISS, MSCI ESG Research, RepRisk, 
Sustainalytics Company ESG Reports, Thomson Reuters ESG Research Data. 
2 Retrieved on October 1, 2019, from https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgkell/2018/07/11/the-remarkable-rise-
of-esg/#17418caf1695 
3 This positive link between ESG certification and the demand towards ESG stocks are in line with Holmstrom 
and Tirole (1997)’s theoretical framework in which uninformed lenders will only invest in firms that are 
monitored by the informed lenders. Sufi (2009) use the same framework to explain the certification impact of 
loan ratings by Moody's and Standard & Poor on firm’s financial and investment policy. 
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have confounded previous studies in developing and emerging markets, where the adoption 
of an ESG rating is not randomly distributed across firms. In another words, there exists 
systematic differences between firms with an ESG rating and those without that could lead to 
overestimation of the effects of an ESG rating.
4
 Importantly, this approach provides a 
template for investigation of this issue in economies where the financial markets are not as 
developed as those in major economies. 
We add to the literature on ESG and CSR
5
 on whether these policies are value 
enhancing or destroying (e.g. Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). The existing literature that 
provides support for the positive view of CSR include studies that find firms with higher CSR 
are associated with lower levels of idiosyncratic risk (e.g. Boutin-Dufresne and Savaria 2004; 
Lee and Faff 2009), higher market-to-book ratios (e.g. Galema et al. 2008), favorable loan 
contracts (e.g. Goss and Roberts 2011; Nanday and Lodh 2012) and lower cost of equity 
(Ghoul et al. 2011; Plumlee et al. 2015). The alternate view is that pursuing these policies can 
lead to an overinvestment in CSR  at the shareholders’ expense. Empirical studies 
demonstrating value destruction include studies that show firms with higher CSR disclosure 
are associated with weak corporate governance (e.g. Barnea and Rubin 2006; Brown et al. 
2006) and have a higher cost of equity (e.g. Richardson and Welker 2001). 
The empirical evidence from this study supports the positive benefits of ESG and is 
consistent with the benefits from certification found in other industries: food industry (e.g. Jin 
and Leslie 2003; Bollinger et al. 2011); automotive industry (e.g. Sexton and Sexton 2014;) 
and the commercial real estate industry (e.g. Brounen and Kok 2011; Holtermans and Kok 
2019). The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the data and 
method; Section 3 discusses the empirical results; and Section 4 concludes the study. 
 
2. Data, variable description and method 
The Bloomberg ESG database covers more than 11,500 corporations in 83 countries and had 
over 18,800 subscribers in 2018.
6
 The number of Bloomberg ESG subscribers to this 
database  has more than tripled during the period 2012-2018. The data used in this study is 
obtained from Bloomberg and covers all listed firms in Malaysia across 11 sectors according 
                                                             
4 In an unreported probit regression, we find our sample firms with Bloomberg ESG score tend to be mature 
(large, low growth and low debt), high performing (high Tobin’ Q) and carry lower tangible assets. 
5 The common theme underpins both CSR and ESG is “sustainability” which according to Clark et al. (2014) is 
“one of the most significant trends in financial markets for decades”. Some researchers however (e.g. Friede et 
al. 2015) treat CSR and ESG interchangeably. 
6
 Retrieved on October 1, 2019, from https://www.bloomberg.com/impact/products/esg-data/. 
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to the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS).
7
 Malaysian firms are chosen as our 
sample of study due to the gradual inclusion of an ESG rating since 2005.  
(Insert Figure 1 about here) 
 
Figure 1 shows that there were only 2 firms (0.2% of total listed firms) with an ESG 
score in 2005. This number increased rapidly over the next 7 years before stabilizing at 80 
firms (8.7% of total listed firms) during the period 2015-2018. 
 
(Insert Table 1 and Table 2 about here) 
 
Table 1 defines the variables used in the regression analysis, while Table 2 displays 
the summary statistics. The sample ranges from 640 to 670 for the various firm-year 
observations. All continuous variables used in the regression analysis were winsorized at the 
1st and 99th percentile to avoid the influence of extreme observations.
8
An event study 
framework is used to identify the causal inference of ESG rating inclusion on firm value. The 
event window is centred on the year of the ESG rating inclusion. After inclusion, firms will 
carry scores based on the extent of a firm’s environmental, social and governance disclosure. 
Bloomberg collects this ESG information through a firm’s corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) or sustainability reports, annual reports and websites, and other public sources, as well 
as from direct contact with the firm. The ESG score (range from 0 to 100) is computed from 
120 quantitative and qualitative measures across environment, social and governance 




A fixed effects panel regression model is used to assess the impact of ESG inclusion 
on Malaysian firm value in terms of the cost of capital and Tobin’s Q. The regression model 
is estimated as follows: 
                                                             
7 The top 3 sectors with highest number of firms with ESG rating in descending order are: industrials, consumer 
staples and financials. Our regression results are robust the exclusion of firms in financial sector. 
8
 We also adopt the following filters to omit observations with extreme values: Tobin’s Q more than 20 times, 
cost of capital less than zero or more than 30%, cash holdings more than 50%, asset growth more than 300%, 
ROA greater than 100% or less than -100% and total assets less than USD100,000. 
9 In unreported tests, we also examine the impact of ESG score on firm value (Tobin’s Q and cost of capital). 
We however do not find any significant relationship between ESG score and firm value. These contradictory 
findings suggest that while the existence (certification) of ESG scores matter, the value of ESG scores do not. 
These contradictory findings suggest that while the existence (certification) of ESG scores matter the value of 
ESG scores do not. Although this seems surprising, it is not conceivable to expect investors in developing 
countries such as Malaysia to give more weight to the existence of ESG score given the fact that only 8.7% of 
listed firms in Malaysia are ESG rated.  
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 Cost of capitalit =α0 +α1ESG inclusion it + θ2Firm characteristicsit + α3Time effect t + fi + εit (1) 
 
 Tobin’s Qit =α0 +α1ESG inclusion it + θ2Firm characteristicsit + α3Time effect t + fi + εit   (2) 
 
The dependent variables are cost of capital and Tobin’s Q measured in each year (t) for each 
individual firm (i). ESG inclusion is a dummy variable indicating the number of years after 
inclusion to Bloomberg’s ESG rating. Firm characteristics are a vector of six firm 
characteristic variables: firm size; asset growth; cash holdings; debt ratio; asset tangibility; 
and ROA. For simplicity all these variables are defined in Table 1. The controls variables 
used in equations 1 and 2 are similar in spirit to Goss and Roberts (2011) and Nandy and 
Lodh (2012) that examine the impact of CSR disclosure on a firm’s cost of debt. Time effect 
is a dummy variable that equal one for the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) years (2008 and 
2009) and zero for non-crisis years.
10
 The firm level fixed effects are absorbed by fi and ε is 
an error term. 
 
(Insert Figure 2 and 3 about here) 
3. Results 
3.1 Graphical evidence 
Figure 2 tracks the average cost of capital 5 years before and after the ESG inclusion event. 
We observe a hump shape pattern, where the cost of capital increases prior to the ESG 
inclusion events and declines after inclusion. Figure 3 tracks the average Tobin’s Q also 5 
years before and after inclusion. We observe a slight increase in Tobin’s Q in the first year 
following ESG inclusion and a clear spike in the second year after inclusion. This graphical 
evidence provides preliminary evidence of the positive impact of ESG rating on firm value. 
 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
4.2 Multivariate tests 
Next, we formally examine the impact of ESG rating inclusion on the firm’s cost of 
capital and value in a multivariate framework. Table 3 of Model 1 covers all windows with 
length ranging from 1 to 5 years surrounding an adoption event. Model 2 and 3, on the other 
hand, covers a narrower 3 and 5-year event window, respectively. Total number of firm-year 
observations for each side of the window is perfectly balance. Different event windows are 
                                                             
10 The regression results are robust to the inclusion of year dummies and interest rate. This result is available 
upon request from the authors. 
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used to ensure the robustness of our results. Models 3 and 4 further decompose the cost of 
capital into the firm’s cost of equity and cost of debt.  
The coefficient for ESG inclusion is negative and significant across all models. The 
coefficient value ESG inclusion in Model 1 implies that the cost of capital reduced by 1.2% 
upon inclusion to Bloomberg’s ESG rating. This effect is economically significant 
considering the average cost of capital was 8.9% for firms in our sample. Models 4 and 5 
further highlight the value enhancement of ESG inclusion: it benefits the cost of equity, but it 
has no significant impact on the cost of debt.
11
 Not reported here is the significant impact of 
ESG inclusion on the cost of equity, which was robust when using 3-and 5-year event 
windows.   
Turning to the control variables in Model 4 and 5, the results confirm that large firms 
are associated with a higher cost of equity. This finding suggests that large firms in Malaysia 
do not benefit from their lower default probability, better access to financing and economies 
of scale as documented  in the developed country literature, as reported by Titman and 
Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Fama and French (2002). The coefficient of 
the debt ratio is significant, but moves in the opposite direction to the cost of equity 
(negative) and cost of debt (positive), as shown in Models 4 and 5. The negative impact of 
the debt ratio on the cost of equity is contrary to Modigliani and Miller (1958)’s seminal 
paper that predicts the cost of equity should rise as the firm increases its debt. These findings 
highlight the unique institutional environment of Malaysia. One plausible explanation of this 
finding is the positive monitoring effects from using more bank loans that mitigate the agency 
cost of debt, hence, lead to a lower cost of equity (Diamond, 1984 and Fama, 1985). Asset 
tangibility and ROA (profitability) also exert a positive impact on the cost of debt. This again 
is contrary to the prediction of trade-off theory that hypothesizes that profitable firms and 
firms with high tangible assets, should all else be equal, lead to lower bankruptcy risks and a 
lower cost of debt. 
 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
 
                                                             
11 For robustness, we also replace cost of equity with implied cost of equity computed using constant dividend 
growth formula R=D1/P+G where D1 is the estimated EPS in future one year multiple with payout ratio of 0.5. 
G is the estimated average long-term growth while P is the current stock price. All data are obtained from 
Datastream. The coefficient of implied cost of equity is negative and significant at the 10% level. Total number 
of observations are however reduced by half due to missing value problem associated with estimated long-term 
growth (G). This result is available upon request from the authors. 
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Table 4 presents the regression results for the impact of ESG rating inclusion on 
Tobin’s Q. The coefficient of ESG inclusion is positive and strongly significant in Model 1. 
This finding corroborates the findings in Table 3 and shows that ESG rating is valued by the 
stock market. The coefficient value suggests that the stock market attaches a 31.9% premium 
to firms with an ESG rating. The coefficients for ESG inclusion are, however, insignificant 
when we adopt narrower event windows of 3- and 5-years, as shown in Models 2 and 3. 
However, they point toward the expected direction. These results suggest that the positive 
certification effects on Tobin’s Q tend to diminish over time. 
ROA is the only control variable that is significant across all the estimated models. 
These results reveal that profitable firms tend to be highly valued by the stock market. The 
debt ratio is also positively related to firm value. This finding is consistent with Modigliani 
and Miller (1958)’s prediction that in a perfect capital market, risk (stock return) should 
increase with leverage. The negative and significant relationship between asset tangibility and 
Tobin’s Q could be explained by growth opportunities proxied by asset tangibility. Under 
these circumstances, firms with higher growth opportunities (less tangible assets), all else 
being equal, should have a higher Tobin’s Q.  Cash holding is also marginally positive and 
significant in Model 3, but turns insignificant, with an opposite sign, in Model 1.  
 
4. Conclusion 
This study contributes to the international debate and research on the impact of an ESG rating 
on firm value. We investigate a sample of Malaysian listed firms that were given a 
Bloomberg ESG rating, over the period 2005 to 2018. The results show that on average a 
firm’s cost of capital reduces by 1.2%, while Tobin’s Q increases by 31.9%, upon receiving 
an ESG rating. These findings demonstrate the benefits to stakeholders from firms pursing an 
SRI or ESG agenda. It should also encourage activist investors as well as responsible 
investment given the positive impact of ESG certification on firm value. The mandatory 
disclosure of ESG information is also worth considering as a policy tool by regulators
12
. The 
findings also suggest that compared to the debt market, the equity market is more receptive to 
the adoption of ESG ratings. This implies that ESG disclosure may not be a first order 
priority in corporate lending decisions. 
  
                                                             
12 Currently, Bursa Malaysia requires listed companies to report on their Corporate Social Responsibility 
performance, but does not stipulate the form in which disclosure should be presented. 
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Table 1: Description of variables  
Variable Description  
Tobin’s Q The sum of market capitalization, total liabilities, preferred 
equity and minority interest divided by total assets. 
Cost of capital Weighted average cost of equity and cost of debt. The 
weights equal the percentage debt or equity in firm’s total 
assets. 
Cost of debt Total after-tax cost of long and short-term adjust for 
Bloomberg’s proprietary debt adjustment factor. 
Cost of equity Derived from capital asset pricing model where cost of 
equity = risk free rate + beta (market risk premium). Risk 
free rate is the country’s 10-year long-term bond rate. Beta 
is computed from a regression of the historical trading 
prices of the stock against the market index using weekly 
data over a two-year period. Market risk premium is the 
return on a country’s stock market minus the risk free rate. 
ESG inclusion (0,1) Indicator variable equals to one for firm-year observations 
with ESG score and zero otherwise. 
Total assets In USD million as reported on the balance sheet. 
Asset growth  One year total assets growth. 
Cash holdings Cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets. 
Debt ratio Total debt divided by total assets. 
Tangibility Net fixed assets divided by total assets. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the full sample 2005 to 2018 
 
Mean 
Median Std. Dev Min Max No of 
Obs. 
Tobin’s Q 1.831 1.254 1.520 0.626 9.894 640 
Cost of capital 0.093 0.089 0.030 0.044 0.203 663 
Cost of debt 0.026 0.029 0.015 0 0.066 664 
Cost of equity 0.112 0.109 0.036 0.056 0.214 664 
ESG disclosure 
(0,1) 
0.500 0.500 0.500 0 1 670 




34.326 1,008,261 665 
Asset growth  0.123 0.083 0.205 -0.380 1.153 649 
Cash holdings 0.139 0.114 0.102 0.002 0.496 665 
Debt ratio 0.223 0.205 0.168 0 0.625 664 
Tangibility 0.352 0.352 0.216 0.002 0.888 665 
ROA 0.077 0.059 0.084 -0.123 0.449 651 
 
Notes: Total number of observations represent firm-year observations with perfectly balanced 5-year (62 firms) 
and 5-year (56 firms) event windows during the study period. 
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Table 3: Impact on the cost of capital of the introduction of an ESG score 
 
 
Notes: The table presents the estimation results on the determinant of cost of capital using fixed effect 
panel regressions. Our key variable of interest is ESG inclusion, a dummy variable equals to one for 
firm-year observations with ESG score and zero otherwise. We use an event study framework to 
identify the causal inference of introduction of Bloomberg’s ESG score on firm’s cost of capital. The 
event windows centered around 1-5 years before and after the introduction of ESG scores. t statistics 











                                         Dependent variables 
Explanatory variables Cost of 
capital  
(All 

















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 0.001 0.086*** 0.061 0.022 0.017 
 (0.03) (3.46) (1.17) (-0.52) (1.34) 
ESG inclusion (0,1)  -0.012*** -0.009** -0.009** -0.014*** -0.002 
 (-3.61) (-2.50) (-2.44) (-3.39) (-1.09) 
Log (Assets)  0.017*** 0.007* 0.010 0.020*** -0.001 
 (4.06) (1.96) (1.34) (3.71) (-0.38) 
Asset growth 0.004 0.014** 0.007 0.009 -0.002 
 (0.77) (2.09) (0.81) (1.20) (-0.81) 
Cash Holdings  0.010 0.012 -0.011 0.024 0.009 
 (0.53) (0.64) (-0.47) (0.92) (0.85) 
Debt Ratio  -0.140*** -0.150*** -0.110*** -0.069*** 0.032*** 
 (-8.36) (-7.84) (-4.17) (-3.47) (3.54) 
Asset Tangibility -0.019 -0.026* -0.020 -0.015 0.013* 
 (-1.54) (-1.76) (-0.89) (-0.88) (1.75) 
ROA 0.041 0.016 0.023 0.044 0.023** 
 (1.39) (0.42) (0.50) (1.08) (2.04) 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of Observations 647 477 337 647 647 
R
2
(within) 0.28 0.30 0.17 0.14 0.07 
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Table 4: Impact on Tobin’s Q of the introduction of an ESG score 
 
Note: The table presents the estimation results on the determinant of firm Tobin’s Q using fixed effect 
panel regressions. Our key variable of interest is ESG disclosure, a dummy variable equals to one for 
firm-year observations with ESG score and zero otherwise. We use an event study framework to 
identify the causal inference of introduction of Bloomberg’s ESG score on firm’s Tobin’s Q. The 
event windows centered around 1-5 years before and after the introduction of ESG scores. t statistics 
are reported in parentheses, while ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ refer to statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 Dependent variables  
Explanatory variables Tobin’s Q  
(All window)                    
Tobin’s Q 
(5-year
window)                    
Tobin’s Q  
(3-year 
window)                   
Intercept 2.229** 1.946*** 1.697*** 
 (2.44) (3.29) (3.06) 
ESG inclusion (0,1)  0.319*** 0.203 0.090 
 (2.83) (1.60) (0.95) 
Log (Assets)  -0.108 -0.092 -0.080 
 (-0.79) (-0.91) (-0.88) 
Asset growth -0.304 -0.375 -0.271 
 (-1.45) (-1.09) (-0.88) 
Cash Holdings  -0.281 0.183 1.569* 
 (-0.53) (0.28) (1.86) 
Debt Ratio  1.226** 0.909 1.319 
 (2.32) (0.95) (1.60) 
Asset Tangibility -1.244* -0.392 -0.042 
 (-1.74) (-0.67) (-0.07) 
ROA 6.872** 6.748** 4.791** 
 (3.12) (2.31) (2.09) 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm effects Yes Yes Yes 
No of Obs 636 469 328 
R
2
(within) 0.28 0.25 0.19 
     
         
